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In the Room Where it Happens: Including the
“Public’s Will” in Judicial Review of Agency Action
by Twinette L. Johnson
INTRODUCTION
In the popular Broadway musical play Hamilton, there is a
scene where Aaron Burr learns he was not privy to a dinner
conversation that transpired amongst Alexander Hamilton,
Thomas Jefferson, and James Madison.1 During this dinner, the
three (Madison, Jefferson, and Hamilton) agreed on a
compromise that would make what is now Washington, D.C.,
the nation’s capital, and which would allow the federal
government to tax the states.2 When Burr hears of this
compromise, he knows he has been left out of the conversation
on these matters.3 To lament being left out, Burr begins to sing
a song decrying not just his absence from “the room where it
happens,”4 but also alluding to the fact that no one really knows
what happens in the room. 5 Burr says, “No one really knows
how the game is played[,] [t]he art of the trade, [h]ow the


Professor of Law and Director of Academic Success Programs, University of the
District of Columbia David A. Clarke School of Law. I would like to thank the editors of
the Arkansas Law Review for inviting me to their Symposium, Hiding in Plain Sight: What
Education Reform Needs, my fellow symposium participants for their attentive ears and
thoughtful comments, and the symposium attendees for their helpful questions and
reactions to my presentation on this topic; my fellow panelists at the Association of
American Law Schools Discussion Panel entitled The Role of Law in Educational
(In)Equality for allowing me the opportunity to present and discuss the ideas associated
with this article; and my research assistant, Kwebena Owusu-Koduah for his assistance in
conducting the research for this essay.
1. See Lin-Manuel Miranda, In the Room Where it Happens, in Hamilton: An
American Musical (Atlantic Recording Corp. 2015).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. See id.
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sausage gets made[,] [w]e just assume that it happens[,] [b]ut no
one else is in[,] the room where it happens.” 6
In the context of higher education reform, the people need
to be in the important rooms where the decisions are being
made. One such room is the courtroom. This essay elaborates
on this premise, previously written about in an article I wrote
entitled, 50,000 Voices Can’t Be Wrong, But Courts Might Be:
How Chevron’s Existence Contributes to Retrenching the
Higher Education Act.7 That article was the second in a series
of three articles on the retrenchment of the Higher Education
Act of 1965 (“HEA”) using the William Eskridge and John
Ferejohn statutory entrenchment model. 8
It argues that
9
Chevron’s deference to agency action works to undermine the
historical policy of the HEA because it prevents courts from
considering the people’s will when reviewing agency action. 10
To support the inclusion of the people’s will, the article critiques
the standard mechanisms for ensuring the people’s participation
and collaboration in agency decision and rule-making. 11 This
essay continues to urge a rethinking of deference schemes as
applied to agency decision-making and rule promulgation when
an entrenched super statute like the HEA is at issue. 12 But, it
does so through the lens of historic and current judicial
philosophies regarding a court’s role in shaping the law. Using
6. Miranda, supra note 2.
7. Twinette L. Johnson, 50,000 Voices Can’t Be Wrong, But Courts Might Be: How
Chevron’s Existence Contributes to Retrenching the Higher Education Act, 103 KY. L.J.
605, 606 (2014-15) [hereinafter Johnson, Voices].
8. Other articles in the series are Twinette L. Johnson, Going Back to the Drawing
Board: Re-Entrenching the Higher Education Act to Restore Its Historical Policy of
Access, 45 TOL. L. REV. 545, 549–50 (2014) [hereinafter Johnson, Going Back to the
Drawing Board (describing the historical policy of the Higher Education Act and arguing
that political machinations are obfuscating the real issues associated with higher education
reform) and Twinette L. Johnson, Reimagining Accountability: A Move Toward ReEntrenching the Higher Education Act, 28 U. FLA. J. L. PUB. P OL’Y 35, 42–43 (2017)
[hereinafter Johnson, Reimagining Accountability] (arguing for a move from pure
accountability assessment schemes to a combination of accountability and performancebased assessment to preserve the policy of wide-spread access associated with the Higher
Education Act). These articles will be referenced for background information.
9. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
10. Johnson, Voices, supra note 8, at 610.
11. See id. at 624–33 for a discussion on why participation and collaboration by the
people in the administrative rule-making process does not preclude a separate assessment
of the people’s will when reviewing agency action.
12. See id. at 611.
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jurisprudence as the context, this essay attempts to justify
including the people’s will at all levels of judicial review of
agency action.
Thus, to create a place for the people’s will in the
courtroom, two things must happen. First, judicial deference to
agency decision-making and rule promulgation must be
reimagined and re-conceptualized such that courts seek out and
take notice of the sociological impact of agency action. 13
Second, the measure of sociological impact must be treated as
more than mere opinion, but rather as reliable statements of the
people’s will that courts consider when reviewing agency
action. 14
Judicial deference to agency action must be reimagined and
reconceptualized where agency action directly impacts
provisions that have become engrained in societal expectation
and necessary for societal well-being. One such societal
provision is the opportunity to attain a post-secondary
credential. The HEA15 was promulgated with just that in
mind.16 The HEA’s undergirding policy supports wide-spread
access to higher education such that the people have the
opportunity to earn a credential that will assist them in becoming
fully functioning members of society. 17 It is thus necessary to
consider whether deference is appropriate when courts review
Department of Education (“DOE”) action that impacts society in
ways that do not align with the legislation’s policy.
Courts often employ deference schemes when considering
agency action. The policy behind taking such an approach is

13. See id. at 609–10.
14. Contra Tracey E. Robinson, By Popular Demand? The Supreme Court’s Use of
Public Opinion Polls in Atkins v. Virginia, 14 GEO. MASON C.R. L.J. 107, 134–35 (2004)
(describing polls as unreliable in measuring public opinion due to inconsistent use and
questionable scientific methods).
15. Higher Education Act of 1965, 20 U.S.C. §1001 (2016).
16. Erica R. Dines, The Higher Education Act of 1965, THE THIN TWEED LINE,
(Mar. 17, 2012), http://humanstudy.org/category/higher-education-law/; see Johnson,
Going Back to the Drawing Board, supra note 9, at 552 (stating that the HEA “sought to
bridge the economic gap for citizens stuck in a revolving cycle and hereditary legacy of
poverty by providing the means to pursue higher education”).
17. Dines, supra note 17 (stating that “[t]he HEA was an important piece of
legislation which, by providing financial assistance to under-privileged individuals,
increased the opportunity for previously unattainable education, leading to the betterment
of society”).
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generally rooted in two main premises. One premise is that
Congress, in creating the agency and enacting the law the
agency is to administer, has the ultimate authority to determine
the nature and extent of an agency’s action.18 Congress,
however, cedes much of the day-to-day administration of the
law to the agency. 19 This transfer of authority confirms the
second premise, that the agency has the superior expertise to
administer the law through its decisions and promulgations.20
With these two foundational premises at work, courts then
review agency action using deference schemes best encapsulated
in the Chevron case.21 Generally, Chevron deference operates
on the predetermined belief that as long as the agency is
operating under the general statutory guidelines set by Congress
in the enacting legislation and according to its expertise, agency
action should receive deference. 22 While seemingly logical in
theory, in practice, Chevron deference creates a “mechanical
jurisprudence,”23 and a move away from the “study of the
sociological factors that underlie law.”24 In accepting deference
18. See McNollgast, The Political Origins of the Administrative Procedure Act, 15 J.
L., ECON., & ORGS., 180, 184 (1999) (stating that delegating to agencies allows
Congress to write simpler statutes).
19. Alan B. Morrison, The Administrative Procedure Act: A Living and Responsive
Law, 72 VA. L. REV. 253, 256 (1986).
20. See McNollgast, supra note 19, at 184. However, that delegation creates both
agency and political drift. Agency drift can occur when the agency acts outside its
statutory agenda and is out of control. Id. Political drift can occur when elected officials
can influence the agency to adopt policies not in line with the policy agreement of the
enacting parties. Id.
21. See generally Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837 (1984).
22. See id. at 842–43. The Chevron doctrine encompasses two steps. Id. First the
courts determine whether Congress has, through its statute’s language, spoken clearly
regarding the agency action at issue. Id. at 842. Only if Congressional intent is unclear is
there a need to move on to the second step, which determines whether the agency action is
based on a permissible construction of the statute under which it gets its power. Id. at 842–
43. If Congressional language is silent or ambiguous with respect to the issue, the court
will defer to the agency’s interpretation if it is reasonable analysis. Id.
23. Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Wielding the Double-edged Sword: Charles Hamilton
Houston and Judicial Activism in the Age of Legal Realism, 14 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J.
17, 28 (1998) (a tribute to Charles Hamilton Houston) (describing “mechanical
jurisprudence” as a “mode of legal thought canonized by Classical Legal Thinkers . . .”).
Fairfax also credits Roscoe Pound for authoring the phrase. Id. at 28–29 (citing Roscoe
Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 605, 605 (1908)).
24. See id. at 29 (recognizing the sociological school of jurisprudence’s approach to
making the law as one that “should not be derived through supposed universal and
OF
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to agency decision-making and rule promulgation as it currently
stands, the judiciary has in essence divested itself from a critical
role: to facilitate the discussion and normative debate necessary
to ensure that laws ensconcing little “r” rights (such as
education) not guaranteed by the constitution, but codified and
sustained over time, continue to serve the purpose for which
they were originally enacted.25
The administration of education at post-secondary levels is
an essential pathway to full and meaningful participation in
society.26 However, education and the way it is provided in the
United States has long been under attack. Ideals associated with
education as the great equalizer are not being realized as
society’s composition and needs change. A growing immigrant
population, as well as a minority population, that are perpetually
underrepresented in almost all facets of society signal clearly
that the ideals associated with education have not been
realized. 27 In fact, long established policy towards creating
educational opportunities to those historically denied
educational access are being retrenched. 28 Education, conceived
almost as a public good, is being economized through

axiomatic first principles, but rather through a study of the sociological factors that
underlie the law”).
25. Johnson, Reimagining Accountability, supra note 9, at 44 (describing “a super
statute as recognize[ing] a right, not granted by the Constitution, but claimed by citizens as
necessary and vital to fully functioning in society). Further, “[s]uper legislative enactments
[such as the HEA] . . . become entrenched as citizens reclaim the rights granted by those
enactments over and over again by pushing [] lawmakers to revisit [them] as the public’s
needs shift and adjust over time.” Id.
26. Dines, supra note 17.
27. See Jeanne Batalova and Elijah Alperin, Immigrants in the U.S. States with the
Fastest-Growing Foreign-Born Populations, MIGRATION P OLICY INSTITUTE: MIGRATION
INFORMATION
SOURCE
(July
10,
2018),
https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/immigrants-us-states-fastest-growing-foreignborn-populations https://perma.cc/D4UY-DBGX (“[T]he Census Bureau projects that net
international migration will be the main driver behind U.S. population growth between
2027 and 2038.”); see generally More Hispanics Are Going to College and Graduating,
But Disparity Persists, PBS NEWS HOUR (May 14, 2018, 4:53 PM) [hereinafter, PBS
NEWS], https://www.pbs.org/ newshour/education/ more-hispanics-are-going-to-collegeand-graduating-but-disparity-persists [https://perma.cc/3PR3-YDDX] (explaining that
while there has been an increase in the Hispanic college population, there remains a divide
between White and Hispanic students in term of six and for year graduation rates which
leave many Hispanics in lower paying jobs).
28. See Johnson, Going Back to the Drawing Board, supra note 9, at 562–75, for a
discussion on the retrenchment of the HEA.
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commodification and marketization. 29 This has led to an
increase in oversight which has simultaneously caused a
decrease in quality. 30 These happenings are proof that the
democratic process (touting participation and collaboration in
making and administering the law) does not work as it should
when groups affected are subject to prejudice.31 In such
instances, the court must step in to ensure that the democratic
process works as it should.32 Thus, courts should play a critical
role in ensuring that the education provision and the historical
policy undergirding it are not lost through political machinations
and reform proxies that obfuscate the real issues affecting
them.33
Additionally, views of sociological impact regarding
agency action as ranking inferior to interpretations of
congressional intent and agency expertise must be rethought. At
the turn of the century and during the rise of the industrial
complex, the courts and the nation at large where in a
contentious debate about the role of the judiciary in making
law.34 This time was marked by a seminal case – Lochner v.
New York35 where the United States Supreme Court famously
struck down legislation that would limit employees’ work
hours.36 While the principles supporting the disposition of the
Lochner case were eventually overturned,37 the case stands as an
29. See generally Osamudia R. James, Predatory Ed: The Conflict Between Public
Good and For-Profit Higher Education, 38 J.C. & U.L. 45 (2011), for a discussion on the
difficulty in administering the education provision when it is conflated with market-based
distribution.
30. See generally Johnson, Reimagining Accountability, supra note 9, for a critique
of the impact of numbers-based accountability assessment schemes in determining whether
schools are meeting their obligations in providing meaningful access to higher education
opportunities.
31. David A. Strauss, Is Carolene Products Obsolete?, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1251,
1257–58 (2010); see also Johnson, Voices, supra note 8, at 624–33, for a critique of the
participation and collaboration aspects of rulemaking.
32. See Strauss, supra note 32, at 1258.
33. Id. at 1257.
34. Barry Friedman, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE 167 (2009) (describing the turn
of the century as a period of “popular clamor about judicial review”).
35. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
36. Id. at 64 (rejecting a New York law imposing limits on workplace hours based
on freedom of contract).
37. West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 380 (1937). In West Coast, the
Supreme Court upheld a Washington state law requiring minimum wages for women as not
violating the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution. Id. at 392. The Court rejected the
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example of the judicial philosophy that guided courts’ review of
the social legislation of the time – a philosophy rooted in
promoting the interest of wealthy owners of industry and not
those who were being exploited by it. 38 Professor Barry
Freidman describes the era as one in which “the courts used the
Constitution as a basis for invalidating laws enacted by popular
legislative bodies . . . [in] hundreds and hundreds of adjudicated
disputes in the state and federal courts.”39
The people’s rejection of the Lochner era approach to
judicial review has had stymying effects on judges’ ability to
look outside the language of the law when reviewing agency
action. During the Lochner era, judges routinely struck down
social legislation that would assist the working class in
establishing suitable working conditions. 40 This legislation,
enacted by elected lawmakers, was routinely considered
unconstitutional and thus rejected by the judiciary.41 This essay
does not suggest a return to the Lochner era when judges used
constitutional originalism as a proxy for striking legislation that
did not align with their own personal and economic selfinterests.42 Rather, this essay suggests that the judicial activism
of the Lochner era be rethought to form a new judicial
philosophy – one that combines courts’ willingness to look
outside of the law when reviewing agency action and to

argument that the state law was unconstitutional because it was rooted in freedom of all
parties to contract. Id. at 392. The Court stated that there was no “absolute and
uncontrollable liberty” recognized by the Constitution. Id. The Court explained that “the
liberty safeguarded is the liberty in social organization which requires the protection of law
against the evils which menace the health, safety, morals[,] and welfare of the people.” Id.
at 391; see Alex McBride, Supreme Court History: Capitalism and Conflict, THIRTEEN
MEDIA
WITH
IMPACT
(Dec.
2006),
https://www.thirteen.org/wnet/supremecourt/capitalism/landmark
_westcoast.html
[https://perma.cc/D3RD-Y6HB] (describing West Coast as ending Lochner era
jurisprudence, as well as describing other landmark cases of the era).
38. Fairfax, supra note 24, at 32; (stating that judges, during the turn of the century
industrial revolution period, routinely struck down progressive legislation favoring the
lower and working classes).
39. Friedman, supra note 35, at 173 (comparing other periods of judiciary
controversy as being evidenced by “one or a handful of cases provoking heated debate”
and the Lochner era as involving “hundreds and hundreds” of such cases).
40. Id. at 167–68.
41. Fairfax, supra note 24, at 32.
42. Id.
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recognize and search out sociological impact when doing so.43
This will not result in a return to the Lochner era judicial
activism of the industrial revolution, but will be more akin to
the “social engineering” advanced by Charles Hamilton
Houston.44 Houston described social engineering as using the
law and “‘ whatever science demonstrates . . . both to foster and
to order social change for a more humane society.’”45 This
jurisprudence takes into account the people and their will – the
social and economic norms that encompass the people’s
preferences for, beliefs on, and desires for access to those things
that would make them better societal members.46
This essay will discuss the importance of courts’
considering the people’s will when reviewing agency decisionmaking and rule promulgation. In doing so, Part I will explore
the reason for including the people’s will in judicial decisionmaking. The goal of this section is to position the people’s will
as an integral part of judicial review of agency action. This
section will also reinforce the importance of the people’s will in
maintaining entrenched super statutes, such as the HEA, which
seek to preserve, over time, rights deemed essential to societal
well-being. Part II will discuss what should comprise the
people’s will. The purpose of this section is to recognize and
legitimate the vast information regarding the people’s
preferences, beliefs, and desires generated by a social movement
and its participants in terms of defining the people’s will. Part
III of this essay will generally explore how existing legal
constructs might be expanded to allow the people’s will into the
courtroom in a meaningful and sustained way. The goal of this
section is to consider ways in which the people’s will can be
elevated from opinion to information deemed critical when
reviewing agency decision-making’s and rule promulgation’s
impact on society.
43. Id. at 26 (quoting Charles Hamilton Houston’s jurisprudential philosophy of
using the courts to socially engineer change); “The best way to . . . involve the court in
interpretive exercises beyond purely language and dictionary battles is to create a deference
exception for entrenched super statutes.” Johnson, Voices, supra note 8, at 634 (citing
Robert Choo, Judicial Review of Negotiated Rulemaking: Should Chevron Deference
Apply?, 52 RUTGERS L. REV. 1069, 1083 (2000).
44. Fairfax, supra note 24, at 26.
45. Id.
46. Johnson, Voices, supra note 8, at 614.
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I. WHY INCLUDE THE PEOPLE’S WILL IN THE
COURTROOM?
That the people’s will be considered is important when
reviewing agency action under a statute such as the HEA. The
HEA was promulgated in 1965 after research and study
confirmed that access to post-secondary education was crucial to
personal, societal, and economic survival. 47 “[T]he Act sought
to elevate post-secondary education as the means by which
citizens could lift themselves up from and remain out of
poverty.”48 The key to understanding the historical policy
behind the Act is recognizing how it came about: through
activism. 49 With regard to education, the people, through their
lived experiences and the capture of those experiences in data
and studies, set out to demand access to that which would assist
them in fully realizing their potential as full members of
society.50 Armed with this information, the people advocated,
through demonstrations, protests, writings and other mediums,
for access to a post-secondary credential that would ensure
meaningful participation and thus existence in society.51 In
response, Congress enacted ground-breaking education
legislation addressing education, at all levels, including postsecondary access.52
The way in which the HEA came about, as well as its
continued existence since its inception, positions it as more than

47. Johnson, Going Back to the Drawing Board, supra note 9, at 576.
48. Johnson, Voices, supra note 8, at 606.
49. See Douglas NeJaime, Constitutional Change, Courts, and Social Movements,
111 MICH. L. REV. 877, 881 (2013) (describing social movements, in the context of
creating constitutional law, as “influenc[ing] public opinion in their favor [and] changing
the culture with which constitutional law interacts”); see generally David Cole, ENGINES
OF LIBERTY : THE P OWER OF CITIZEN ACTIVISTS TO M AKE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2016),
for a historical description of important legal changes and arguing that they occurred
because of a systemic citizen activist approach to changing the hearts of and minds of
society who thus demanded that the change be reflected in the law.
50. Dines, supra note 17.
51. See Johnson, Going Back to the Drawing Board, supra note 9 at 546–58, for a
discussion on the social advocacy associated with the HEA.
52. Id. at 608 (citing Robert Dallek, FLAWED GIANT: LYNDON JOHNSON AND
HIS TIMES, 1961-1973, 79 (1998)).
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an ordinary statute, but a super statute.53 It is one of those
statutes that can be labeled “super” using William Eskridge and
John Ferejohn’s entrenchment model. 54 Under this model,
Eskridge and Ferejohn posit that super statutes represent a
“statutory constitutionalism . . . [that has grown] out of social
movement demands that government . . . regulate private as well
as public institutions.”55 Statutes such as the HEA thus operate
more like constitutional gap fillers entrenching within society an
expectation of a certain right to and supplying a provision for
higher education that is not granted under the Constitution. 56
The statute thus becomes entrenched and achieves “super” status
as society continues to advocate for it by highlighting how the
statute provides benefits and rights society has come to rely
on.57 It is this advocacy, by the public, that brings about the
statute’s existence and that sustains it over time. 58 The Eskridge
and Ferejohn entrenchment model encompasses this advocacy as
part of the normative debate that all stakeholders (the people, the
legislature, and the judiciary) participate in as the statute
develops into one that represents the will the people. 59 When
the judicial review process does not recognize the people’s
societal and economic goals as part of its understanding of the
law’s purpose, it stymies the normative debate process and
potentially produces results that are out of line with the people’s
will. The people’s activism provides both the foundation and
continuing purpose for super statutes such as the HEA. Thus,
this activism cannot be eschewed by the courts when
stakeholders seek the court’s guidance in determining whether
subsequent laws are in alignment.

53. Johnson, Voices, supra note 8, at 612–13 (statutes become “super” through the
entrenchment process as the statute changes, through the normative debate process, to meet
the needs of the people).
54. Johnson, Going Back to the Drawing Board, supra note 9, at 550–51 (citing
William N. Eskridge & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE L.J. 1215, 1217 (2001)).
55. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF NEW STATUTES:
THE NEW AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 121 (2010).
56. Johnson, supra note 8, at 606.
57. Johnson, Going Back to the Drawing Board, supra note 9, at 547.
58. Id.
59. Johnson, Voices, supra note 8, at 606 (citing ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note
57, at 121).
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A. Deference Creates a Barrier to Including the
People’s Will in the Judiciary’s Review of Agency
Action
The historical policy undergirding the HEA (wide-spread
post-secondary access to traditionally underrepresented people)
cannot be achieved without reimagining the process of
reviewing, monitoring, and even sheparding laws designed to
provide rights that are pivotal in equipping an ever-changing
public with what it needs to participate fully in society. 60 As
long as the undergirding policy is intact that the people have
meaningful opportunity to attain a post-secondary credential
that will make them better able to function in society review of
agency action regarding that policy must consider the social and
economic norms of the people. 61
In a failed attempt to reform the Lochner judiciary which
frequently struck down progressive social legislation meant to
help the poor and working classes during the Industrial
Revolution, President Theodore Roosevelt criticized the Court
describing it as “a power which may give one man or three men
or five men the right to nullify the wishes of the enormous
majority of their ninety million fellow-citizens.”62 While
President Roosevelt’s motives may have been slightly different
from those expressed here, the “concern” for the power of the
judiciary and how it is used is consistent. The power of the
court is not in nullification or “mechanical jurisprudence” that
works to meet the needs of political constituents instead of the
needs of the people.63 Rather, it is the power the judiciary has as
full participants in the democratic process of shaping the law for
the good of the people.64 This is not a move toward the judicial
activism of the past where jurists sought to review and interpret
the law with their own social and economic realities at the
forefront, but rather judicial social activism in the same vein as
60. Dines, supra note 17.
61. See Freidman, supra note 35, at 167 (describing the sentiment of the President
and Progressives, who decried much of courts actions in rejecting legislation meant to
defend the working class against being victimized by “corporate corruption of politics and
the social injustices that were the product of America’s industrial revolution”).
62. Id.
63. Fairfax, supra note 24, at 29.
64. Id. at 28–29.
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Charles Hamilton Houston’s social engineering jurisprudence
that requires knowledge of the realities of human social life. 65
Although courts have recognized sociological impact in
many high-profile cases, the initial concern remains. 66 Are the
people (their preferences, beliefs, and desires), in the rooms
where these decisions are happening? When courts rely on
Chevron deference when reviewing and interpreting agency
action with respect to the HEA, is the people’s will left out?67
Chevron reduces interpretation to dictionary battles in many
instances and sets a standard that favors agency action
presenting an almost insurmountable burden to those who would
challenge.68
Even though members of society who have been
historically underrepresented in post-secondary institutions are
attending college in record numbers, they are still unable to
achieve the same level of employment and thus pay as their
white counterparts.69 Deference should not hide this critical
information.When agencies act and stakeholders appear in
courts to address agency action, courts should recognize that the
very presence of the parties before a decision-making tribunal
signals a possible breakdown in the administration and/or
operation of the law. While this essay does not argue for a
particular outcome in these instances, it does argue for a
particular approach: one that considers how the law in question
affects the very people it was designed to serve.
Under the Chevron deference construct, the people’s will is
too easily discarded. Chevron deference is premised, in part, on
the belief that the agency has superior expertise on the given
issue.70
When this belief is coupled with a legislative
interpretive scheme that is essentially limited to text of the
statute, courts create a powerful impediment to including the
people’s will in its review of agency decision-making and rule
65. Id.
66. See Jack M. Balkin, How Social Movements Change (or Fail to Change) the
Constitution: The Case of the New Departure, SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 27, 27–28 (2005), for a
list of famous social movements that changed constitutional law.
67. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43
(1984).
68. Choo, supra note 44, at 1083.
69. PBS NEWS, supra note 28.
70. Johnson, Voices, supra note 8, at 635; McNollgast, supra note 19, at 184.
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promulgation. 71 This approach ultimately leaves the people out
of the courtroom as the judiciary uses Chevron deference to
rubber stamp what the agency does instead of looking at agency
action through the lens of the people’s needs.

B. Judges Must Become More “Active” in
Incorporating the People’s Will in its Review of Agency
Action
By the turn of the century, the United States had entered its
Industrial Revolution.72 Cities were bursting with new industry
rooted in mass production of goods.73 As the public’s appetite
grew for these mass-produced goods, so too did the industrial
complex which would provide them. 74 Large factories and the
mass production machines they housed became the de rigeur
business model in major cities. 75 What also became common
were the many workers needed to operate these factory
machines many of whom were immigrants.76 While these
immigrants came to America looking for an opportunity to
better themselves and become full members of American
society, they were met with long hours, dangerous working
conditions, child labor exploitation, and inadequate pay in the
work place.77
Progressive politicians enacted legislation that would
address and ease these workplace issues. 78 Even though this
legislation was seen as representing the people’s will since the
people elected these politicians, courts routinely rejected it.
Courts rejected this social legislation that was meant to level the
position of the workers with that of the corporate elite who
owned the factories.79 The people elected members of the
Progressive Party with the expectation that their elected officials
71. McNollgast, supra note 19, at 184.
72. See Myron Marty, Twentieth Century: Society in the United States, SCHOLASTIC,
https://www.scholastic.com/teachers/articles/teaching-content/ twentieth-century-societyunited-states/ [https://perma.cc/X9T2-4GDN] (last visited Mar. 14, 2019).
73. See id.
74. See id.
75. See id.
76. Friedman, supra note 35, at 168–69
77. Id. at 169.
78. Id. at 170.
79. Id. at 173.
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would enact legislation that would protect them from the
workplace ills that proliferated in the industrial complex. 80 The
courts, however, repeatedly rejected the progressive social
legislation that addressed wages, hours, working conditions, and
other work place associated issues, citing their interpretation of
the Constitution as support.81 The people became increasingly
frustrated with the judiciary’s approach to reviewing laws they
saw as essential to their health and economic well-being. 82
What was supposed to be review was essentially nullification
which systematically “trump[ed] the will of the majority.” 83
This period of judicial activism became known as the Lochner
era.84 It was named after Lochner v. New York,85 a case in
which the United States Supreme Court struck a state law that
would have limited the number of hours employees could work
in a day. 86 In Lochner, the Court held that the statute limiting
work hours was unconstitutional as it violated the Fourteenth
Amendment, according to the Court’s interpretation. 87 The
Court, based on its interpretation of the freedom of parties to
contract, said that the state law impinged on that freedom by
interfering with what should essentially be an agreement
between employer and employee. 88 The Court held the such an
infringement violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.89 Lochner represented a jurisprudence where
judges were active in imposing their opinion based on their own
ideals and constituency under the guise of constitutional
originalism. 90
Dissatisfied with the judicial activist approach, political
figures, members of the legal academy, and even members of
80. See id. at 170 (describing the various laws enacted to protect workers and ensure
their wellbeing, including laws regarding income tax, child labor protection, and work
place safety, hours, and conditions).
81. See Friedman, supra note 35 at 171.
82. See id. at 169, 177.
83. See id. at 168.
84. See id. at 167.
85. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 53.
88. Id. at 57-58.
89. Id. at 53.
90. Corey Rayburn Yung, Flexing Judicial Muscle: An Empirical Study of Judicial
Activism in the Federal Courts, 105 NW. U. L. REV., 1, 12 (2011).
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the judiciary stood up against the Lochner era judges and their
consistent rejection of any legislation set to help the poor and
working class. 91 The Lochner era judicial decisions also sparked
new social movements and invigorated existing ones in the fight
against these types of rulings.92 The Lochner era rulings thus
gave rise to Legal Realism as a jurisprudence. 93 Legal Realism
was built on a foundation of viewing the law and the legislature
enacting it as the supreme source of law. 94 William Eskridge
described Legal Realism as a movement which had pioneers
“not just of the Harvard and Princeton trained intellectuals,
but . . . also lawyers and leaders of social movements whose
members’ interests were not represented” in the original
constitutional interpretive jurisprudence perpetuated by the
Lochner era courts.95 Legal Realism was thus born out of
grassroots advocacy aimed at stopping courts from nullifying the
people’s will by rejecting popular social legislation of the time. 96
While conceived to preserve progressive legislative
enactments geared toward assisting the people, Legal Realism
took a subversive turn as courts took a hands-off approach in the
form of deference. What was meant be an end to judicial
activism translated, over time, into a mechanical approach to
judicial review. 97 Courts, in an effort to completely exclude
their opinion, did not disturb legislation at all. 98 This translated
into a rigid deference that courts favored the legislature with.

91. Friedman, supra note 35, at 188-91; but see id. at 168 (stating that because
opinion polling barely existed at the time, it is impossible to know whether Lochnerera
decisions truly trumped the people’s will).
92. Friedman, supra note 35, at 191.
93. Id.; Fairfax, supra note 24, at 30.
94. Fairfax, supra note 24, at 32 (stating that Legal Realism placed “. . . the
legislature and administrative agencies . . . [and] not the courts . . . [as] the rightful social
and economic policy makers”).
95. William Eskridge, Some Effects of the Identity-Based Social Movements on the
Constitutional Law in the Twentieth Century, 100 MICH. L. REV. 2062, 2355 (2002).
96. Fairfax, supra note 24, at 31 (Legal Realism was the result of “law professors,
judges, and attorneys” simultaneously taking an interest in jurisprudence and seeking more
humane conditions for society).
97. See id., supra note 24, at 32; see generally McNollgast, supra note 19, at 193
(describing the departure from substantial judicial involvement regarding review of
legislation and increased reliance on the law-making body as a move to prevent political
drift).
98. See Fairfax, supra note 24, at 32.
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And that favor, over time, has extended to agency decision and
rule-making in the form of Chevron deference.
This approach is inappropriate in situations where the
issues are based on a legislative enactment that operates to
provide rights that the public has come to rely on to fully
function in society. Today, the operating law associated with
entrenched super statutory enactments, often comes in the form
of agency decisions and rules. 99 These decisions and rule
promulgations, undertaken to administer the statute on a day to
day basis, must also be reviewed by the judiciary with the
people’s will in mind. Yet, Chevron deference has the effect of
blocking the people’s will in much the same way that Lochnerera courts blocked popular legislation under the guise of
constitutional interpretation.100 Lochner judges summarily
struck down social legislation based on constitutional
interpretations favoring freedom of contract.101 Judges invoking
Chevron deference rubber stamp agency action based on
congressional supremacy and agency expertise. 102
Both
approaches ignore the people’s will in the review process. Legal
Realism closed the door to the judicial activism of the Lochner
era. But, in doing so, it also closed the door to any active
participation by judiciary. Chevron has only compounded this
by supporting the position that judges should not play a role in
shaping and guiding the law. This approach must change. The
judiciary must instead be an integral participant in the process of
judicial review as it “. . . respond[s] to and advance[s] changes
emanating from outside the courts. . ..”103
Some would argue that the people are represented in
agency action through their electing power and ability to
participate in agency negotiated rule-making and notice and
comment aspects of rule promulgation.
However, these
seemingly democratic means of including the people are
threatened by political machinations that obfuscate the real
99. Morrison, supra note 20, at 256.
100. See generally id. at 261 (stating that while the Administrative and Procedural
Act’s purpose “. . . was to protect regulated parties from precipitous agency action . . . [,]”
there was little to no concern regarding “the intended beneficiaries . . .” of the regulation).
101. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 53.
102. See McNollgast, supra note 19, at 184.
103. NeJaime, supra note 50, at 882-83 (“constitutional change is a bottom-up
process in which courts are not leading, but instead are responding to external changes.”).
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issues to manipulate the public.104 “Elections offer citizens the
opportunity to assess [conditions], demand changes, and to hear
from politicians how those demands might be met.”105 But there
are always serious questions as to whether all demographics can
participate or are “elitely stimulated” enough to know about
opportunities for participation.106
Judges are not meant to insert their own opinions and yet
they cannot be automatons in reviewing agency action. Instead,
they must be active in considering the times, the people who live
in the times, and the effect that agency decisions and rules will
have on the people’s ability to fully function in society. 107

II. CAPTURING THE PEOPLE’S WILL?
The “people’s will” refers to social and economic norms
that encompass the people’s preferences for assistance in
achieving certain goals, beliefs on a given problem or issue, and
desires for access to those things that would make them better
societal members.108 The people’s will can be captured through
any number of devices, including the history related to how the
statute at issue came about and what policy emerged to support
and sustain it.109 The people’s will can also be captured through
data collection, polls and surveys, and sociological impact
studies.110

104. Strauss, supra note 32, at 1258 (stating that there are groups that are not able to
play their proper role in the democratic process and when this happens, courts have a role
to play because the self-correcting democratic processes – such as freedom of contract,
elections, other participatory and collaborative mechanisms – will be nullified leaving only
the court to make the democratic process work).
105. Johnson, Voices, supra note 8, at 615. See id. at 614-18 for a discussion of the
issues related with solely relying on elections and the administrative process as an
indication that the law reflects the people’s will.
106. Id. at 626.
107. See Friedman, supra note 35, at 187 (describing the public’s lack of faith in the
law as judges routinely interpreted the Constitution as mandating that they strike down
legislation that reflected the will of the people).
108. Johnson, Voices, supra note 8, at 614.
109. Id. at 618-20, 622.
110. Id. at 618-19.
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A. Social Movement History Should Be Included as Part
of a Court’s Interpretive Instrumentalities When
Reviewing Agency Action
Social movement history would explain why the law was
originally enacted in terms of what societal needs it attempted to
meet. It would simultaneously prioritize the impetus for
creating the law and serve as an overarching mission statement
or goal in reviewing the administration of the law over time.
Understanding and evidencing the public’s support for a statute
and its undergirding purpose is a crucial aspect of judicial
review of agency action regarding an entrenched super
statute.111
In the Eskridge and Ferejohn super statutory entrenchment
model, a statute gains its super status and becomes entrenched
because the statute has expanded and contracted over time to
meet the needs of the people through the normative debate
process that includes all stakeholders.112 “Claims . . . thought
unthinkable become reasonable . . . because of the ways . . .
social movement activism shapes popular and elite
understandings of the [people and what they value].”113
The women’s suffragist movement serves as an example of
how a social movement, particularly one resulting in super
statutory enactment that becomes entrenched over time (such as
the HEA), can influence law making. 114 The central focus of the
women’s suffragist movement, developed over time, was to
111. See Michael L. Wells, Sociological Legitimacy in Supreme Court Opinions, 64
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1011, 1030-31 (2007) (stating that the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People’s approach to end segregation through litigation
emphasized its rank of sociological legitimacy over moral legitimacy). Id. ([“N]o matter
how strong one’s moral and legal arguments, without sufficient public support, an effort to
vindicate them might nonetheless fail.”); NeJaime, supra note 50, at 882 (stating that “. . .
new constitutional meaning becomes authoritative not because a court decided so
independently, but because social movements have persuaded political forces, opinion
leaders, the public, and judges that a new position is reasonable and, in fact, correct”).
112. Johnson, Voices, supra note 8, at 612-13 (citing Eskridge and Ferejohn, supra
note 56, at 13 (stating that statutes are entrenched in terms of accepted norms and practices
and because the entrenchment represents . . . “a popular consensus that the norm or practice
is a good thing to believe or do”).
113. NeJaime, supra note 50, at 883.
114. See Eskridge, supra note 97, 2355-56 for a description of the women’s
suffragist movement which was devoted to securing a Constitutional amendment that
would allow women to vote.
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secure an amendment to the Constitution which would guarantee
the right to vote for women. 115 This essay focuses on the
inclusion of social movement history in the judicial review
process when agency action relating to an entrenched super
statutory enactment is at issue. While different, a comparison of
the two – social movements aimed at constitutional amendment
and social movements aimed at encouraging Congress to enact
and maintain legislation – is instructive. Professor Jack Balkin
illustrates this by offering an interesting syllogism regarding
how social movements impact the law.116 He describes the
suffragist movement as a four-step progression in securing the
woman’s right to vote:
(1) Women were citizens. (2) Citizens enjoyed the
privileges and immunities of citizenship, guaranteed by
Article IV and the Fourteenth Amendment. The privileges
and immunities of citizenship were national in character
and paramount over state authority to the contrary. (3) The
right to vote was one of those privileges and immunities
because without it the United States would not be a country
dedicated to popular sovereignty and governed by its
citizens. Therefore (4) women had the right to vote. 117

Using Professor Balkin’s syllogism as an example, a
similar syllogism can be used to summarize the progression of
the social movement supporting wide-spread access to higher
education and how it resulted in the HEA’s enactment: (1) All
people deserve to participate fully and meaningfully in
democratic society;118 (2) This participation requires leveling
the field for those who have been unable to fully participate in
society due to their social and economic status; 119 (3) Post115. See Balkin, supra note 67, at 38-49 for a detailed discussion of the movement
associated with securing the right to vote for women.
116. Id. at 42.
117. Id.
118. Johnson, Going Back to the Drawing Board, supra note 9, at 546, 550. This
ideal has been one espoused not only by social movements, but also by politicians over
time. “If we would prevent the growth of class distinctions and would constantly refresh
our leadership with the ideals of our people . . . [t]he full opportunity of every boy and girl
to rise through the selective process of education can alone secure to us this leadership.”
President Herbert Hoover, Inaugural Address (Mar. 24, 1929), available at
http://www.hooverpresidentialfoundation.org
/inaugural_address.php
[https://perma.cc/V7P9-ALJL].
119. Johnson, Going Back to the Drawing Board, supra note 9, at 554.
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secondary education has proven to be a path suited for that
purpose.120 In fact, over time, the need for a post-secondary
credential has become significantly pronounced as wage gaps
continue to expand between the historically underrepresented
(minority and economically poor) and their historically
represented counterparts (majority and wealthy);121
(4)
Therefore, post-secondary education access should be available
on a wide-spread basis so that all may have the opportunity to
obtain a post-secondary credential to assist them in becoming
fully participating members of society.122
The history of a social movement’s progression is a rich
source of information. It chronicles how the social movement
formed, how it informed the polity, and the way it advocated for
enactment of a law that would address a social ill. Given this,
courts must consider the social movement history that played a
significant part in not just enacting the statute, but in setting the
policy which would sustain it.123

B. The People’s Will Can Also Be Captured
through Independent Data Collection and Research
Devices to Assess Public Need and Public Preference in
Providing that Need
The people’s will can also be captured through a variety of
independent data collection devices such as polls, surveys, and
social science studies that can shed light on the sociological
impact of agency action. For instance, data regarding high
school graduation rates and post-secondary matriculation could
be recognized in determining whether agency action, with
regard to the HEA, is thwarting or promoting opportunity to

120. Id. at 546.
121. Id. at 549 (citing Marilyn S. Thompson et al., Understanding the Differences in
Postsecondary Educational Attainment: A comparison of Predictive Measures for Black
and White Students, 75 J. NEGRO EDUC. 546, 546 (2006)).
122. Compare Johnson, Going Back to the Drawing Board, supra note 9, at 546, 550
with Balkin, supra note 67, at 42.
123. See Balkin, supra note 67, at 27-28 for a list of famous social movements that
changed constitutional law; but see Balkin, supra note 67, at 27 (“Social movements may
protest long and loud for recognition of their constitutional claims, but judges are not
supposed to heed them. Rather, they are supposed to follow the law, as best they can
determine what the law is.”).
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attend and graduate from a post-secondary institution.124 Data
capturing post-secondary attrition and graduation rates along
social and economic strata could also provide a lens by which
the judiciary might review agency action. 125 Courts could also
recognize polls and surveys which capture parents’ and students’
attitudes about the value of post-secondary education.126 This
would be helpful for the judiciary in developing a broader view
of a rule, how it works, and how it should work according to the
people’s will. 127 Courts could recognize job placement and
earnings studies that track the earning potential of people with a
post-secondary credential compared to those without.128
Focused social science research can also provide information on
the impact of existing rules and thus project future impact based
on continuing with a rule or implementing a rule change.129
This information creates a broader context for the court and
creates for it an opportunity to juxtapose the rule’s purported
impact with the actual impact it has or could have on the people
it was created to serve.
As courts, particularly lower courts, recognize and even
seek this information, decisions where courts have considered
the sociological impact of a statute become precedent and thus
form part of the narrative that all stakeholders use to “explain
124. Such information may be found on a United States government education
website containing databases featuring information on high school matriculation, attrition,
and graduation.
See Data Tools, THE NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT.,
https://nces.ed.gov/datatools/ [https://perma.cc/HW56-WCLE]. See also Parents Attitudes
on the Quality of Education in the United States, NORC CTR. FOR PUB. AFF. RES. (2013),
http://www.apnorc.org/projects/Pages/parents-attitudes-on-the-quality-of-education-in-theunited-states.aspx [https://perma.cc/GR5S-HCRW], for an example of additional data
regarding parents’ attitudes on the quality of elementary and secondary education in the
United States.
125. See Data Tools, supra note 125.
126. Id.
127. See John Immerwaher, Public Attitudes on Higher Education: A Trend
Analysis, 1993 to 2003, PUB. AGENDA (2004), https://www.publicagenda.org
/pages/public-attitudes-higher-education [https://perma.cc/4CRW-6E35], for an example of
a survey analyzing the value parents place on higher education, their concerns about it,
their beliefs about how social class and access impact the ability to obtain a post-secondary
credential, etc.
128. See Thompson, et al., supra note 122 for a discussion of a study focused on
post-secondary credential earning power, which found that those with a post-secondary
credential earned more than those without.
129. See Johnson, Voices, supra note 8 for examples of courts taking notice of social
science studies describing the social impact of a rule based on constitutional principles.
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legitimate social change, repudiate past injustices, and justify
calls for further development.”130 Thus, judicial consideration
of sociological impact increases the chances that judges will
reach results that align with the people’s will. It also ensures
that sociological impact becomes an integral and normative part
of agency decision-making and rule promulgation. 131
Using social science to capture sociological impact is not
without its critics. Social science research can be both nonexistent on an issue and considered inappropriately used when it
does exist.132 Scholars note the lack of social science research
may be due to the judiciary using instruments (social science
based studies) that are not entirely compatible with the
instruments it typically uses to review issues. 133 For instance,
social scientists create hypotheses and engage in rigorous data
collection and analysis to determine if the hypothesis is true or
true or false. 134 “[L]awyers . . . [, on the other hand,] subscribe
to the fight theory, which holds that the primary goal is to
organize facts in a the manner most beneficial to the client.”135
Because of this, courts are also accused of failing to use social
science information in the way it should be used.136
Additionally, critics consider social science research unreliable
because social scientists can use their knowledge of data
gathering and analysis to produce results aligned with their own
values while still labeling their work as objective science.137
But these potential issues should not discount the use of social
science by courts. Just as with any other evidentiary offering,
the trier of fact can determine accuracy by inquiring about

130. NeJaime, supra note 50, at 883.
131. Cf. Robert T. Teranishi, Carola Suarez-Orozco and Marcelo Suarez-Orozco,
Immigrants in Community Colleges, 21 FUTURE OF CHILDREN 153, 155 (2011) (describing
the lack of national database with information on the community college matriculation
amongst immigrant students).
132. Michael Rustad and Thomas Koenig, The Supreme Court and Junk Social
Science: Selective Distortion in Amicus Briefs, 72 N.C. L. REV. 91, 113 (stating that courts
“might use more social science information if there were more reliable research”).
133. Id.
134. See id. at 117-18 (explaining that “[s]ocial science employs an analytical and
empirical approach to research problems . . . [with many] . . . goals . . . [including testing]
a hypothesis of a causal relationship between variables”).
135. Id. at 118.
136. Id. at 117.
137. Rustad and Koenig, supra note 133, at 116.
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research methods. In fact, recognizing this information at the
lower court level, instead of introducing it at the final stage of
litigation in the highest courts, allows the information to be
vetted more thoroughly. 138

III. IN THE COURTROOM—WHERE IT HAPPENS
The goal here is to propose methods that would include the
people’s will in the courtroom in a meaningful and sustained
way. While courts sometimes recognize sociological impact,
this happens most often when weighty and controversial issues
implicating the constitution are involved.139 “The nation’s
highest courts have frequently employed judicial notice to
ensure that its decisions were connected to the society in which
we operate.”140 But, how does sociological impact address
judicial review at lower court levels and when the issue
involves little “r” rights not granted by the Constitution, but
secured by entrenched super statutes? One of the main purposes
behind super statute entrenchment is to meet the current needs of
the people without having to engage in the long and protracted
battle for a constitutional change. 141 Addressing the social ill
plaguing the people through statutory enactment, rather than
constitutional change, allows a solution to reach the people more
immediately. 142 It also creates a path for the frequent ongoing
normative debate that shapes the statute to meet the people’s
needs.143 This shaping often involves the courts as the agency
administers the statute and as the people engage with it.144
Thus, the court’s role in this process should not be one that
ignores all that has transpired in creating and maintaining the

138. See generally Dorothy F. Easley, Judicial Notice on Appeal: A History Lesson
in Recent Trends, 84 FLA. B.J. 45, 45 (2010) (“Social and scientific studies have remained
significant to decisions in major constitutional cases to avoid unjust results.”).
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. See 16 Am. Jur. 2d Constitutional Law §89 (stating that “contemporaneous
construction is usually applied . . . to constitutions [rather] than to laws . . .” as laws can be
changed more immediately through legislative means as compared with constitutional
amendment “which cannot be so readily altered”).
142. Eskridge and Ferejohn, supra note 56, at 16.
143. Johnson, Voices, supra note 8, at 612.
144. See id.
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statute.145 It should be outward looking in terms of discovering
and taking notice of the people’s will.
Judicial notice under the Federal Rules of Evidence may
provide an avenue for including the people’s will in the lower
level courts as the judiciary reviews agency action. Federal
Rule 201 states that:
The court may judicially notice a fact that is not subject to
reasonable dispute because it (b)(1) is generally known
within the trial court’s territorial jurisdiction; or (b)(2) can
be accurately and readily determined from sources whose
accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned. The court (c)(1)
may take judicial notice on its own; or (c)(2) must take
judicial notice if a party requests it and the court is supplied
with the necessary information. 146

Judicial notice reduces the burden on judges in finding
facts by allowing judges to recognize facts that are common
knowledge. 147 While the judiciary has frequently taken notice of
social and scientific research, this has happened mostly at the
United States Supreme Court level. This practice should be
expanded such that courts reviewing agency action, at all levels,
can take judicial notice of the sociological impact of an agency’s
decision or rule. This ensures that the people’s voice will be in
the courtroom when agency action is under review. It also
ensures efficiency in producing court decisions that reflect the
people’s will. In this way, the relative immediacy that an
entrenched super statute provides, in terms of change to address
the people’s needs, is not lost.148

CONCLUSION
When the DOE acts pursuant to the HEA, the people ought
to have a real and influencing opportunity to have their voices
heard. They must be, or at least their voices must be, in the
room where it happens. That’s not just in the voting booth, the
offices of negotiated rule-making sessions, or through notice and
comment procedures. These devices have their place in the
145.
146.
147.
148.

Id. at 621 (citing Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483. 491 (1954)).
FED. R. EVID. 201(b)-(c).
Easley, supra note 139, at 45.
See Eskridge and Ferejohn, supra note 56, at 16.
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normative debate that shapes a law, but they cannot be the whole
of what constitutes the people’s will when reviewing agency
action for alignment. Courts must hear the people’s will through
social movement history, research, studies, and other devises.
That stakeholders find themselves in court means that normal
communication and approaches to problem solving have broken
down.149 It is the courts that, from a position of involvement
and not neutrality, are positioned to help the stakeholders find a
solution that aligns with the people’s will.

149. Johnson, Voices, supra note 8, at 622.

